Node API
The CLI is the supported way to run the build pipeline. The Node package additionally exports five modules for clients that need to understand, prepare, or execute local boxes: validate a document, derive a target ID, check a signature, resolve a workspace, or run a verified application.
import { boxTargetId, documentKinds } from 'scrollcase/contract';
import { isSignedBoxDocument } from 'scrollcase/contract/browser';
import { sha256File, resolveWorkspace } from 'scrollcase/build';
import {
verifyAndExtractBox, attachExtractedBox, verifyExtractedPayload, runExtractedBox, runBox,
} from 'scrollcase/consumer';
import { verifySignedDocument } from 'scrollcase/sign';The JSON Schemas and golden fixtures are exported as files too:
import scrollSchema from 'scrollcase/contract/schema/scroll.schema.json' with { type: 'json' };
import targetCases from 'scrollcase/contract/fixtures/target-id-contract.json' with { type: 'json' };TypeScript types
The box format's types are generated from the JSON Schemas and shipped with the package:
import type {
BoxTarget,
BoxScroll,
BoxManifest,
BoxReleaseManifest,
BoxChannelManifest,
BoxRevocationsManifest,
SignedBoxDocument,
} from 'scrollcase/contract/types';
const target: BoxTarget = {
platform: 'linux', arch: 'x86_64', accelerator: 'cuda', cudaVersion: '12.4',
};The schemas are the source of truth; these types are a projection of them, never a second definition. A schema change that is not accompanied by npm run types fails the test suite, so the two cannot drift — the same discipline that makes the licence audit a function of the lock.
This subpath is types only: there is nothing to import at runtime, so use import type. scrollcase/contract, scrollcase/contract/browser, scrollcase/build, scrollcase/consumer, and scrollcase/sign also ship declarations generated from the typed JSDoc beside their JavaScript implementations. Strict TypeScript consumers therefore get checked parameters, return values, narrowing guards, hover documentation, and completion without a build step or a separate types package. npm run types:check fails if either the schema-derived format types or the runtime declarations drift from their source.
scrollcase/consumer
scrollcase/consumer prepares and executes release documents and archives already present on the local machine. Every path and trust anchor comes from the caller. It never selects a channel, downloads an archive or asset, installs globally, updates an existing destination, or applies application lifecycle policy.
import {
attachExtractedBox,
verifyAndExtractBox,
verifyExtractedPayload,
runExtractedBox,
runBox,
} from 'scrollcase/consumer';
const prepared = await verifyAndExtractBox('release.json', {
publicPath: 'trusted-keys.json',
archive: 'box.zip',
destination: '/srv/boxes/example-1.0.0',
});
const result = await runExtractedBox(prepared, {
args: ['--port', '8080'],
env: { APPLICATION_MODE: 'local' },
stdin: 'ignore',
stdout: 'inherit',
stderr: 'inherit',
});Preparation
verifyAndExtractBox(releaseDocumentPath, { publicPath, archive, destination }) verifies the signed document against a single trusted-key file or key bundle, validates the v2 release, checks archive size and SHA-256, rejects unsafe ZIP entries, extracts through the shared safe extractor, compares box.json recursively with the signed release, checks logical installed size and execution prerequisites, then atomically renames a fresh staging tree into destination. The destination must not exist.
It returns an immutable PreparedBox receipt with signed identity, target, execution, archive and signing information, plus environmentReport, a masked diagnostic snapshot of this process's host environment resolved against the signed declaration. The receipt is process-bound: runExtractedBox rejects copied or constructed lookalikes, and also rejects a prepared root replaced after verification.
For on-demand weights, prepared.requiredAssets contains the signed URL, relative path, size and SHA-256 descriptors. Scrollcase does not fetch them. The caller may materialize those files under prepared.root; execution refuses a missing, non-regular, wrong-size, or wrong-hash asset.
Re-attaching across restarts
A PreparedBox is bound to the process that produced it, so a long-lived application cannot keep one across a restart — and re-extracting gigabytes at every launch is not an answer. attachExtractedBox(releaseDocumentPath, { publicPath, root }) mints a fresh receipt from a directory that is already extracted, without the archive.
It verifies the signed document, requires a target this host can run, checks that the interpreter and execution files are present, and re-checks on-demand assets against their signed hashes. It does not read original payload file contents, though it enumerates paths and measures their metadata, so its original-payload work scales with entry count rather than byte size. Required on-demand assets are hashed in full. The receipt it returns carries status: 'attached' rather than 'prepared', because the bytes on disk were not proved — only the release, and the shape of the directory. Its environmentReport is produced by the same resolver as preparation. runExtractedBox accepts either.
root must be a real directory; a symbolic link is refused, since execution requires a real one.
Verifying an installation
verifyExtractedPayload(releaseDocumentPath, { publicPath, root }) proves the tree on disk is the one the release describes. New boxes carry payload-digest.v1, an entry list naming each original payload path with the SHA-256 of its content, and the signed release commits to that list's own hash. Verification hashes the list, compares it with the release, parses it only then, and checks each listed path — walking the list, never the directory, so files that appear after installation (__pycache__, the model cache, anything the application writes in its working directory) are simply never visited.
It is standalone and opt-in: no other operation calls it, because it reads every listed byte. Call it after installing, on a user's request, or in a maintenance job. Embedded weights are listed and can make the check read tens of gigabytes; on-demand assets are later extras and keep their separate signed per-file verification. File mode and modification time are deliberately not committed. A release built before this field existed is refused rather than silently treated as verified. The returned PayloadVerification also carries environmentReport; it describes the inspecting process, not the payload bytes that were just checked.
What it does and does not prove
It binds a directory to a signed release and detects corruption. It is not a defence against a local attacker: the tree can change between this call and any later import, and no library can close that window — filesystem permissions can, and they belong to the operating system and to your application. Scrollcase does not guard the directory afterwards.
The build collector excludes __pycache__ directories and *.pyc files, so the digest cannot make any assertion about them. That is a permanent blind spot, not only a timing window.
Execution
runExtractedBox(prepared, options) runs only a receipt returned by verifyAndExtractBox or attachExtractedBox in the current process. It rechecks the prepared tree and required assets, enforces the native target, starts the declared script or -m module with the box's own Python, uses the box root as cwd, and appends caller args after signed defaultArgs. It never invokes a shell.
stdin, stdout, and stderr accept Node child-process stdio values or streams. Environment precedence is inherited host, then caller env, then signed release environment; later layers win without filtering any inherited name. SIGINT, SIGTERM, and SIGHUP are forwarded while the child is alive. The returned { exitCode, signal, environmentReport } preserves the child's terminal result and the exact diagnostic used for that spawn.
runBox(releaseDocumentPath, options) composes preparation and execution in a private temporary directory and guarantees cleanup after a normal exit, non-zero exit, spawn failure, or forwarded signal. temporaryDirectory selects the parent for that private root; onPrepared is an optional callback invoked after verification and extraction but before execution, which lets a CLI display the signed identity without reimplementing or repeating the trust chain:
const result = await runBox('release.json', {
publicPath: 'trusted-keys.json',
archive: 'box.zip',
args: ['--once'],
onPrepared: ({ boxId, version, targetId }) => {
console.log(`Running ${boxId} ${version} (${targetId})`);
},
});
process.exitCode = result.exitCode ?? 1;Environment reports
Every preparation, attachment, payload verification, and run result includes a structured report. The compact default contains every release-declared variable, every inherited variable the target adapter identifies as capable of changing executed code, and every conflict, plus remainingVariableCount. A variable records its winning source, visible winning value, whether it is executionAffecting, and all sources in precedence order. Release values are visible because they are already public in the signed document; caller values are visible too. Only inherited host values are "<masked>" by default, so a caller must not log a report containing secrets it supplied through env.
The Node report fields are:
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
mode | "summary" for the compact selection, or "full" after expansion |
hostValuesRevealed | Whether inherited host values are visible |
releaseVariableCount | Number of names supplied by the signed declaration |
conflictCount | Number of names whose sources supplied different values |
dangerousHostVariables | Present inherited names the target adapter identifies as capable of changing executed code |
remainingVariableCount | Resolved names omitted from variables in compact mode |
variables | Selected variable reports, sorted by winning name |
Each variable has name, winning source, visible winning value, executionAffecting, conflict, and sources. Each source entry records its source, exact name spelling, and visible value. Sources are host, caller, release, and — during a verification self-test — validation; later entries have higher precedence. Python exposes the same fields in snake case.
Pass envReport: true to any consumer operation to include every resolved variable name. Pass envReportValues: true to imply the full report and reveal host values deliberately. Python uses env_report and env_report_values. Run operations also accept onEnvironmentReport / on_environment_report, called after resolution and before spawning.
const result = await runExtractedBox(prepared, {
envReport: true,
onEnvironmentReport(report) {
logger.info({ environment: report });
},
});Diagnostic, not guarantee
The environment declaration is signed format data and every verifier checks agreement. An environmentReport is local consumer output: it changes with the host, caller values, flags, and time of execution. A caller that starts venv/bin/python directly gets neither resolution nor a report. Do not describe the report as a property guaranteed by the box.
scrollcase/contract
The single source of truth for what a box is. See The Box Format.
Targets
| Export | Signature | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
boxTargetId | (target) => string | The canonical slug (linux-x86_64-cuda12.4). Throws TypeError on an unsupported or ambiguous target |
boxTargetAdapter | (target) => Adapter | The adapter for a validated target: Python layout, archive backend, native-library inspection, validation environments |
boxTargetAdapters | () => Adapter[] | Every adapter, for enumerating supported targets |
condaSubdir | (target) => string | The conda platform subdir (osx-arm64, linux-64, win-64) |
pixiAccelerator | (scroll) => { accelerator, cudaVersion } | The conda accelerator descriptor a scroll selects, rejecting target drift |
assertNativeHost | (adapter, host = process) => void | Throws unless the current host matches the adapter's OS and architecture |
assertRuntimeEntryPoint | (runtimeId, adapter, entryPoint) => void | Throws unless the entry point matches that runtime's layout for the target |
RUNTIME_IDS | readonly string[] | Every runtime id the format defines: python, node, native. A separate list from what a given build implements, on purpose — the consumers version independently |
runtimeAdapter | (runtimeId) => BoxRuntimeAdapter | The runtime's layout, execution kinds, argv rule and self-test rule. Throws for a runtime with no adapter |
runtimeAdapters | () => BoxRuntimeAdapter[] | Every runtime this build implements |
isImplementedRuntime | (runtimeId) => boolean | Whether an adapter exists — the question to ask before runtimeAdapter |
unimplementedRuntimeMessage | (runtimeId) => string | One wording for a box naming a runtime this build cannot run, so the builder and all three consumers report it identically |
unsupportedSelfTestProbeMessage | (runtimeId, probeKind) => string | One wording for a probe shape the runtime cannot answer — selfTest.imports in a native box, which has no module system |
executionAffectingVariables | (runtimeId, adapter) => readonly string[] | Inherited variables that can change what a box executes: the runtime's loader controls, then the OS's |
isExecutablePayloadPath | (rule, relativePath) => boolean | Whether a payload path is one the runtime requires the executable bit on |
import { boxTargetId } from 'scrollcase/contract';
boxTargetId({ platform: 'linux', arch: 'x86_64', accelerator: 'cuda', cudaVersion: '12.4' });
// → 'linux-x86_64-cuda12.4'Documents
| Export | Signature | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
documentKinds | (namespace = 'scrollcase.box') => { release, channel, revocations } | The kind discriminators under a namespace. Throws on an invalid namespace |
parseDocumentKind | (kind) => { namespace, type } | null | Splits a kind back apart |
isSignedBoxDocument | (value) => boolean | Envelope shape check. Says the document is worth verifying, never that it is valid |
decodeDocumentPayload | (document) => object | Decodes the payload and checks its embedded hash. Does not verify signatures |
schemaUrl | (name) => URL | Absolute URL of a shipped JSON Schema |
fixtureUrl | (name) => URL | Absolute URL of a shipped fixture |
Constants: BOX_SCHEMA_VERSION (3), PAYLOAD_ENCODING ('base64-json-utf8'), SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM ('ed25519'), DEFAULT_DOCUMENT_NAMESPACE ('scrollcase.box'), CHANNELS (['nightly', 'beta', 'stable']).
scrollcase/contract/browser
The platform-neutral subset of the contract for browsers, Workers, and Node. It exports the target helpers, the whole runtime model, the document constants, the namespacing helpers, and isSignedBoxDocument. Its complete module graph contains no Node built-ins.
import {
boxTargetId,
runtimeAdapter,
isSignedBoxDocument,
} from 'scrollcase/contract/browser';The full scrollcase/contract entry point remains the Node surface and exports exactly three things more: decodeDocumentPayload, which needs Node's crypto to hash a payload, and schemaUrl and fixtureUrl, which resolve a file beside the installed package rather than anything a browser can fetch. Cryptographic verification remains under scrollcase/sign; the browser guard checks envelope shape only and never establishes trust.
Decoding is not verifying
decodeDocumentPayload catches a truncated or edited document, because the payload hash must match the bytes. It says nothing about who produced them. Anything acted upon must first pass verifySignedDocument against a trusted key.
Proving a mirror implementation
A client in another language mirrors these rules and validates the mirror against the fixtures:
import { boxTargetId } from 'scrollcase/contract';
import cases from 'scrollcase/contract/fixtures/target-id-contract.json' with { type: 'json' };
for (const { target, targetId } of cases.valid) {
if (boxTargetId(target) !== targetId) throw new Error(`mismatch for ${targetId}`);
}
for (const { target } of cases.invalid) {
let rejected = false;
try {
boxTargetId(target);
} catch {
rejected = true;
}
if (!rejected) throw new Error(`invalid target was accepted: ${JSON.stringify(target)}`);
}scrollcase/sign
| Export | Signature | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
generateSigningKey | ({ privatePath, publicPath, keyId, force }) => Promise<{ keyId, privatePath, publicPath }> | What keygen runs. Refuses to overwrite without force |
readSigningKey | ({ privatePath, publicPath }) => Promise<{ privateKey, metadata }> | Loads the private key and cross-checks it against the published public key |
signDocument | (payload, { signerCommand, privatePath, publicPath, runResult }) => Promise<Document> | Wraps a payload in the signed envelope, locally or through an external signer; runResult is an optional process seam |
verifySignedDocument | (document, trust) => Promise<object> | Verifies against a trusted key file path or an array of keys, and returns the payload. Throws otherwise |
parseTrustedKeys | (source) => TrustedKey[] | Reads both trust-file shapes from text or bytes a caller already holds, rather than from a path |
resolveTrustedKeys | ({ publicPath, trustedKeys }) => Promise<TrustedKey[]> | Resolves exactly one named trust source into the keys verification runs against |
decodeSignedDocument | (document) => { bytes, payload } | Unwraps and checks the payload hash. Does not check the signature |
The trusted key file is either a single key object or a { "keys": [...] } bundle; a document is accepted when any one of its signatures verifies. Every consumer operation that verifies a signed release takes publicPath or trustedKeys, exactly one: an application holding its keys in a keyring, an environment variable or a secrets manager should not have to write them to disk to verify a signature. See Signing & Key Custody.
scrollcase/build
Build primitives. Useful for tooling around Scrollcase — a CI check, a custom staging step, a client that computes the same hashes.
Workspace
| Export | Purpose |
|---|---|
resolveWorkspace({ cwd, overrides }) | Resolve the absolute layout without installing it |
configureWorkspace({ cwd, overrides }) | Resolve and install it for this process |
getWorkspace() | The installed workspace, resolving defaults on first use |
findWorkspaceConfig(startDir) | Walk up looking for scrollcase.config.json |
workspaceOverridesFromFlags(flags) / workspaceOverridesFromArgv(argv) | Collect workspace overrides from a parsed flag map, or raw arguments |
DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PATHS, SCROLLCASE_CONFIG_FILENAME | The defaults and the filename |
import { resolveWorkspace } from 'scrollcase/build';
const workspace = resolveWorkspace({ cwd: '/work/my-project/scrolls/my-model/macos-aarch64-metal' });
// → { root, configPath, scrollsDir, buildDir, distDir, keysDir, toolchainDir }Details in Workspace Configuration.
Archives and filesystem
| Export | Purpose |
|---|---|
createDeterministicZip(payloadDir, archivePath, adapter) | Write a box archive: fixed timestamps, stable ordering, adapter-derived modes |
extractZipArchive(archivePath, destination) | Extract with entry-name validation; rejects traversal, links and special entries |
listZipEntries(archivePath) | Enumerate entries without extracting |
collectFiles(root) | Enumerate files in the one stable order hashing and archiving rely on |
sha256File(path), fileExists(path) | Hashing and existence checks |
payloadDigest(root) | Reduce an extracted tree to the { format, sha256 } a release commits to |
Identity and toolchain
| Export | Purpose |
|---|---|
boxReleaseStem(release) | <boxId>-<version>-<targetId> |
boxReleaseObjectPrefix(release) | boxes/<boxId>/<version>/<targetId> |
builderVersionFields(source) | The builder-identity fields recorded in provenance |
findPixi({ requiredVersion, path, runResult }) | Locate pixi and enforce the scroll's pin |
findCondaPack({ path, runResult }) | Locate conda-pack |
CONDA_PACK_VERSION | The exact conda-pack release installed by Scrollcase (0.9.2) |
pixiLockArguments, pixiInstallArguments, condaPackArguments | The exact argument vectors the build uses |
installAndPackPixiEnvironment({ … }) | Install from the lock, pack, relocate into venv/ |
repairPosixLaunchers(adapter, payloadDir, forbiddenPaths) | Rewrite console scripts to resolve Python next to themselves |
Licence audit
| Export | Purpose |
|---|---|
createCondaDependencyLicenseAudit({ lockBytes, targetId, namespace }) | The inventory, derived from a pixi.lock |
validateCondaDependencyLicenseAudit(reviewed, actual) | Throw unless a reviewed audit still matches the lock exactly |
lockedCondaDistributions(lockBytes) | The parsed distributions with their declared licences |
parseCondaPackageReference(url) | { name, version } from a conda package filename |
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { createCondaDependencyLicenseAudit } from 'scrollcase/build';
const audit = createCondaDependencyLicenseAudit({
lockBytes: await readFile('scrolls/my-model/macos-aarch64-metal/pixi.lock'),
targetId: 'macos-aarch64-metal',
});
// → { schemaVersion, kind, targetId, dependencyLockSha256, packages: [...] }A package without a declared licence throws rather than being reported as unknown.
Process
fail(message) throws the single error shape the CLI turns into a one-line non-zero exit; run and runResult are the process runners the build injects, which is how the test suite drives the pipeline without a real toolchain.